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## 1                    **Infection and Rapid Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Ferrets**

2    Young-Il Kim<sup>1,2</sup>, Seong-Gyu Kim<sup>1</sup>, Se-Mi Kim<sup>1</sup>, Eun-Ha Kim<sup>1,2</sup>, Su-Jin Park<sup>1,2</sup>, Kwang-Min  
3    Yu<sup>1,2</sup>, Jae-Hyung Chang<sup>1</sup>, Eun Ji Kim<sup>1</sup>, Seunghun Lee<sup>1</sup>, Mark Anthony B. Casel<sup>1,2</sup>, Jiyeon Um<sup>4</sup>,  
4    Min-Suk Song<sup>1,2</sup>, Hye Won Jeong<sup>1</sup>, Van Dam Lai<sup>3</sup>, Yeonjae Kim<sup>4</sup>, Bum Sik Chin<sup>4</sup>, Jun-Sun  
5    Park<sup>4</sup>, Ki-Hyun Chung<sup>4</sup>, Suan-Sin Foo<sup>5</sup>, Haryung Poo<sup>6</sup>, In-pil Mo<sup>3</sup>, OK Jun Lee<sup>1</sup>, Richard J  
6    Webby<sup>7</sup>, Jae U. Jung<sup>5,\*</sup>, and Young Ki Choi<sup>1,2,8\*</sup>

7  
8    <sup>1</sup>College of Medicine and Medical Research Institute, Chungbuk National University,  
9    Cheongju, Republic of Korea

10    <sup>2</sup>Zoonotic Infectious Diseases Research Center, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju,  
11    Korea

12    <sup>3</sup>College of Veterinary Medicine, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, Republic of Korea

13    <sup>4</sup>Research institute of Public Health, National Medical Center, Seoul, Republic of Korea

14    <sup>5</sup>Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology, Keck School of Medicine,  
15    University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90033, USA

16    <sup>6</sup>Infectious Disease Research Center, Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and  
17    Biotechnology, University of Science and Technology, Daejeon, Republic of Korea

18    <sup>7</sup>Division of Virology, Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research  
19    Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA

20    <sup>8</sup>Lead Contact

21  
22    \*Correspondence: jaeujung@med.usc.edu (J. J), choiki55@chungbuk.ac.kr (Y.K.C)

23    \*Jae U. Jung

24    Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology,  
25    Keck School of Medicine,  
26    University of Southern California,

27 Los Angeles, CA 90033, USA  
28 Email: jaeujung@med.usc.edu  
29 \*Young Ki Choi  
30 Department of Microbiology, College of Medicine and Medical Research Institute  
31 Chungbuk National University, 1 Chungdae-ro, Seowon-gu,  
32 Cheongju, 28644, South Korea,  
33 Tel: 82-43-261-3384  
34 Fax: 82-43-272-1603  
35 E-mail: choiki55@chungbuk.ac.kr

36 **Abstract**

37 The outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory  
38 syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in China and rapidly spread worldwide. To  
39 prevent SARS-CoV-2 dissemination, understanding the *in vivo* characteristics of SARS-CoV-  
40 2 is a high priority. We report a ferret model of SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission that  
41 recapitulates aspects of human disease. SARS-CoV-2-infected ferrets exhibit elevated body  
42 temperatures and virus replication. Although fatalities were not observed, SARS-CoV-2-  
43 infected ferrets shed virus in nasal washes, saliva, urine and feces up to 8 days post-  
44 infection. At 2 days post-contact, SARS-CoV-2 was detected in all naïve direct contact  
45 ferrets. Furthermore, a few naïve indirect contact ferrets were positive for viral RNA,  
46 suggesting airborne transmission. Viral antigens were detected in nasal turbinate, trachea,  
47 lungs, and intestine with acute bronchiolitis present in infected lungs. Thus, ferrets represent  
48 an infection and transmission animal model of COVID-19 that may facilitate development of  
49 SARS-CoV-2 therapeutics and vaccines.

50

51 *Keywords: 2019-novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), severe acute respiratory syndrome*  
52 *coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), virus shedding,*  
53 *transmission, ferrets*

54            Coronaviruses (CoV) are a large family of viruses that cause respiratory and  
55 intestinal infections in animals and humans (Masters and Perlman, 2013). Of the four genera,  
56 alphacoronavirus, betacoronavirus, gammacoronavirus and deltacoronavirus,  
57 alphacoronavirus and betacoronavirus are commonly associated with respiratory illness in  
58 humans and gastroenteritis in animals (Cui et al., 2019). CoV were not typically considered  
59 to be highly pathogenic in humans until the outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory  
60 Syndrome CoV (SARS-CoV) (Zhong et al., 2003), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome CoV  
61 (MERS-CoV) (Zaki et al., 2012), and more recently, severe acute respiratory syndrome  
62 coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).

63            In late December of 2019, a novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was identified in  
64 Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China from patients with severe pneumonia (Zhu et al., 2020).  
65 Deep sequencing analysis of lower respiratory tract samples revealed the identity of the  
66 causative agent as a newly emerged strain of betacoronavirus, temporarily named 2019  
67 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), which was later renamed as severe acute respiratory  
68 syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) by the International Committee on Taxonomy of  
69 viruses (ICTV) (ICTV, 2020). As of March 23, there have been approximately 81,601  
70 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in China with over 3,276 deaths (WHO, 2020b). The SARS-  
71 CoV-2 has been found to have high human-to-human transmission through close contact  
72 with infected patients, leading to rapid global spread by infected travelers from China. As of  
73 March 23, 2020, SARS-CoV-2 cases have been confirmed in at least 171 countries with a  
74 steady increase in the number of laboratory confirmed cases (251,329 cases) outside of  
75 China suggesting non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies have not ultimately been  
76 successful in limiting spread. Therefore, an animal model that recapitulates the COVID-19  
77 clinical symptoms in human infection is urgently needed in order to decipher the  
78 transmission routes and pathobiology of this virus and to allow testing of pharmaceutical  
79 interventions.

80           Given that SARS-CoV-2 shares higher sequence homology with SARS-CoV (79%  
81 homology) than with MERS-CoV (50% homology), the entry receptor for SARS-CoV, human  
82 Angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (hACE2), was considered as a receptor candidate for  
83 SARS-CoV-2 (Lu et al., 2020). Correspondingly, Bao *et. al* (Bao et al., 2020) reported weight  
84 loss and virus replication in lungs of hACE2 transgenic mice following SARS-CoV-2 infection;  
85 however, no other clinical symptoms such as cough and fever were observed. In order to  
86 understand the rapid spreading characteristics of SARS-CoV-2, additional animal models  
87 that mimic high human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 infections are warranted.  
88 Given that ferret ACE2 has been shown to contain critical SARS-CoV binding residues (Wan  
89 et al., 2020), we performed infection and direct and indirect contact transmission studies  
90 using a ferret model previously developed for influenza virus infections (Park et al., 2018).

91           To demonstrate ferret-to-ferret transmission in an experimental setting, ferrets (n=2)  
92 were inoculated via the intranasal (IN) route with  $10^{5.5}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> of NMC-nCoV02, a strain that  
93 was isolated from a COVID-19 confirmed patient in South Korea in February of 2020. To  
94 evaluate the transmission mode of the virus, naive ferrets (n=2/group) were placed in direct  
95 contact (DC) (co-housed) or indirect contact (IC) (housed in cages with a permeable partition  
96 separating them from infected ferrets) with infected ferrets two days after the primary  
97 infection. Clinical features of SARS-CoV-2 infections were recorded. This study was  
98 repeated in three independent trials (total n=24; direct infection (n=6), DC (n=6), IC (n=6),  
99 and PBS control (n=6) ferrets).

100           NMC-nCoV02-infected ferrets had elevated body temperatures, from 38.1°C to  
101 40.3°C, between 2 and 8 dpi, which returned to normal by 8 dpi (Figure 1A). While reduced  
102 activity was observed in NMC-nCoV02-infected ferrets between 2 and 6 dpi with occasional  
103 coughs, there was no detectable body weight loss or were there any fatalities during the  
104 experimental period. Interestingly, all six DC ferrets showed increased body temperatures  
105 (~39°C) with reduced activity between 4 and 6 dpc and no detectable body weight loss

106 (Figure S1A and B). However, none of the IC ferrets showed increased body temperature or  
107 weight loss over the 12 days of the studies (Figure S1C and D). These data indicate that the  
108 efficient establishment of COVID-19 clinical features in ferrets exposed to infected animals  
109 requires direct contact, recapitulating human-to-human transmission.

110 To investigate SARS-CoV-2 replication and shedding in each group of ferrets, we  
111 collected blood, nasal washes, saliva, urine, and fecal specimens every other day for 12  
112 days. Collected ferret secretions were resuspended in cold phosphate-buffered saline (PBS)  
113 containing antibiotics (5% penicillin/streptomycin; Gibco). For virus titration, total RNA was  
114 extracted from the collected samples using the RNeasy Mini<sup>®</sup> kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany)  
115 according to the manufacturer's instructions (Qiagen, 2012) and cDNA was synthesized with  
116 a cDNA synthesis kit (Omniscript Reverse Transcriptase; QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany). To  
117 quantitate viral RNA copy number, quantitative real-time RT-PCR (qRT-PCR) was performed  
118 targeting the spike (Table 1) and ORF1a (Supplementary Table 1) genes as previously  
119 described (Zhu et al., 2020) using the SYBR Green kit (iQ<sup>™</sup> SYBR Green supermix kit, Bio-  
120 Rad, Hercules, CA, USA). The number of viral RNA copies was calculated by comparison to  
121 the number of copies of a standard control. In the NMC-nCoV02 infected group, viral spike  
122 RNA was detected in all specimens at 2 dpi. The highest amount of viral RNA was detected  
123 in nasal washes and peaked at 4 dpi (3.83 log<sub>10</sub> copies/ml), persisting until 8 dpi before  
124 dropping below detection limits at 10 dpi (Table 1). The virus was also detected in saliva  
125 specimens from 2 dpi (1.73 log<sub>10</sub> copies/ml) through 8 dpi. Although viral spike RNA was  
126 detected in sera of infected ferrets, the viral copy number was low (peaked titer 0.35 log<sub>10</sub>  
127 copies/ml) and dropped below detection limits earlier than in nasal wash and saliva  
128 specimens. To evaluate the infectious virus titer in each specimen, collected nasal washes  
129 and saliva specimens were inoculated onto Vero cells for virus isolation. In IN infected ferret  
130 group, NMC-nCoV02 was isolated from both saliva and nasal washes specimens as early as  
131 2 dpi and persisted until 4 and 6 dpi, respectively (Table 1). Nasal washes specimens

132 showed higher virus titers ( $1.83\text{-}2.88 \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{ml}$ ) than saliva specimens ( $0.82\text{-}0.92 \log_{10}$   
133  $\text{TCID}_{50}/\text{ml}$ ). In DC ferret group, virus was isolated from the nasal washes at 4 day of post  
134 contact (dpc) ( $2.4 \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{ml}$ ) and 6 dpc ( $1.0 \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{ml}$ ), but not in saliva  
135 specimens (Table 1). Because gastrointestinal involvement is a characteristic of corona virus  
136 infections of animals and humans (Leung et al., 2003), we also collected fecal and urine  
137 specimens. Viral RNA was detected in a majority of collected specimens in both IN-infected  
138 and DC groups as early as 2 dpc (Table 1). Similar to the IN infected group, the DC group  
139 had the highest virus copy numbers ( $3.27 \log_{10} \text{copies}/\text{ml}$ ) in nasal washes with RNA  
140 detected through 8 dpc. In addition, viral RNA was detected in saliva and fecal specimens of  
141 the DC group for 8 days, while the urine specimens contained detectable viral RNA until 4  
142 dpc. For the IC group, 2 out of 6 ferrets were positive for viral RNA in nasal washes and fecal  
143 specimens at 4 dpc, although viral RNA copy numbers were lower ( $0.53$  and  $0.52 \log_{10}$   
144  $\text{copies}/\text{ml}$ , respectively) than in DC ferrets. Due to the cytotoxicity of urine and fecal  
145 specimens of ferrets, we could not assess virus isolation and titer in Vero cells. To evaluate  
146 the presence of infectious NMC-nCoV02 in urine and fecal specimens, urine or fecal  
147 specimens (at 4 dpi) of IN-infected, DC or IC ferrets were centrifuged to remove the debris,  
148 and the supernatants inoculated into naïve ferrets ( $n=3$ ) per each specimen. Nasal washes  
149 from specimen-inoculated ferrets were collected at 2, 4, and 6 dpi and infected onto Vero  
150 cells for virus isolation. Noticeably, NMC-nCoV02 was isolated from the nasal wash  
151 specimens of 2 out of 3 urine specimen- or fecal specimen-treated ferrets (Table 1). However,  
152 we failed to re-isolate virus from the ferrets infected with the fecal specimens of IC ferrets.  
153 These results indicate that ferret is highly susceptible for the infection of SARS-CoV-2  
154 derived from body fluids, and infectious SARS-CoV-2 sheds through urine and fecal  
155 specimens of infected ferrets.

156 To assess the replication of SARS-CoV-2 in ferret organs, additional 12 ferrets were  
157 infected with NMC-nCoV02 or PBS via the IN route and 3 ferrets were sacrificed at 4, 8 and

158 12 dpi. Nasal turbinate, trachea, lung, kidney, and intestine tissues were collected using  
159 individual scissors to avoid cross contamination. The highest viral RNA levels were detected  
160 in nasal turbinate (4.2 log<sub>10</sub> copies/g) and lung tissue (1.53 log<sub>10</sub> copies/g) at 4 dpi. Viral RNA  
161 was also detected in intestine (0.93 log<sub>10</sub> copies/g) and kidney (0.87 log<sub>10</sub> copies/g) at 4 dpi.  
162 At 8 dpi, viral RNA was still detected in nasal turbinate, trachea, lungs, kidney, and intestine  
163 (Figure. 1B). In correlation with viral RNA copy numbers (Figure 1B), the highest infectious  
164 virus titer was detected in nasal turbinate (3.23 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/g) and lung tissue (1.4 log<sub>10</sub>  
165 TCID<sub>50</sub>/g) at 4 dpi, while infectious virus recovery failed from trachea, kidney, and intestine  
166 tissues which carried less than 1.13 log<sub>10</sub> viral RNA copies/g (Figure 1C). Finally, infectious  
167 NMC-nCov02 was isolated from nasal turbinate (2.07 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/g) and trachea (1.07 log<sub>10</sub>  
168 TCID<sub>50</sub>/g) at 8dpi, but not from other tissues at 8 dpi (Figure 1C). However, both viral RNA  
169 detection and virus recovery were failed in all tested tissues at 12 dpi. These results suggest  
170 that the ability of virus isolation from infected tissues is closely related with viral RNA copy  
171 number.

172 To further confirm viral replication in infected ferrets, immunohistochemistry (IHC)  
173 and histopathological examinations were conducted (Figure 2 and Figure S2). Briefly, tissue  
174 samples were collected from NMC-nCoV02 infected or PBS-treated ferrets at 4dpi and  
175 incubated in 10% neutral-buffered formalin for virus inactivation and tissue fixation before  
176 they were embedded in paraffin. The embedded tissues were sectioned and dried for 3 days  
177 at room temperature. To detect the viral antigens by IHC, mouse polyclonal antibody raised  
178 by the immunization of mice with inactivated NMC-nCoV02 virions was used as a primary  
179 antibody. Slides were viewed using the Olympus BX53 (Olympus, Tokyo, Japan) microscope  
180 with DP controller software to capture images. IHC analyses showed that a number of cells  
181 in the nasal turbinate, trachea, lung, and intestine sections of NMC-nCoV02 infected ferrets  
182 (Figure 1I-L), but not PBS-treated control ferrets (Figure 1E-H), were positive for SARS-CoV-  
183 2 antigen. Further, the lung histopathology showed that compared with PBS-treated ferrets,

184 NMC-nCoV02 infected ferrets at 4 dpi showed increased immune infiltration and cell debris  
185 in the alveolar wall, bronchial epithelium and bronchial lumen (Figure S2) evidencing acute  
186 bronchiolitis by NMC-nCoV02 infection.

187           After 12 days of infection, all remaining ferrets including IN infection (n=6), DC (n=6)  
188 and IC (n=6) had returned to normal ranges of body temperature and body weight, and all  
189 specimens were negative for viral RNA. To evaluate the seroconversion rate of each group,  
190 sera were collected from all remaining ferrets and a serum neutralizing (SN) antibody assay  
191 against NMC-nCoV02 (100 TCID<sub>50</sub>) was conducted on Vero cells. Although IN infection  
192 group showed the highest mean SN titers compared the other groups, the SN titers of both  
193 IN infection and DC groups ranged between 32-128 (Figure 1D). On the other hand, only 1  
194 of 6 IC ferrets showed a positive SN titer of 16. Taken together, we demonstrate the  
195 presence of SARS-CoV-2 in multiple sources from infected ferrets, potentially explaining the  
196 rapid transmission to naïve hosts in close contact with the infected hosts.

197           Given the rapid geographical spread of COVID-19, the WHO declared the SARS-  
198 CoV-2 outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on the 30<sup>th</sup> of  
199 January, 2020 (WHO, 2020a), and announced COVID19 outbreak a pandemic by 12<sup>th</sup> of  
200 March, 2020 (WHO, 2020c). Most confirmed COVID-19 patients at this time reported close  
201 epidemiological association (direct or indirect) with other COVID-19 patients. Interestingly, a  
202 growing number of individuals with no travel history to China and no direct contact with  
203 infected patients have become infected (Lim et al., 2020). To understand how this virus  
204 rapidly spreads within a community, and to inform infection control messaging, it is essential  
205 to develop an experimental animal model that can support the active infection, shedding,  
206 and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to sentinel animals. In this study, we established an  
207 infection and transmission ferret animal model for COVID-19. The SARS-CoV-2 was found  
208 to efficiently infect ferrets and induce moderate increases in body temperature (~38.5-  
209 40.3°C). Moreover, we were able to detect viral RNA in blood (for 4 dpi), nasal washes (for 8

210 dpi), urine (for 8 dpi) and fecal (for 8 dpi) specimens. findings suggest that SARS-CoV-2 can  
211 be shed through multiple routes of body discharge specimens, potentially serving as sources  
212 for viral transmission to those in close contact with infected individuals.

213 Interestingly, ferrets in direct contact with SARS-CoV-2 infected ferrets were positive  
214 for SARS-CoV-2 infection as early as 2 dpc, suggesting that rapid transmission occurred  
215 even prior to infected ferrets reaching their highest viral RNA copy numbers in nasal washes  
216 at 4 dpi. Transmission also occurred prior to peak body temperature and body weight loss in  
217 infected animals consistent with the infectiousness of individuals during asymptomatic  
218 periods. With regard to potential airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2, viral RNA was  
219 detected in nasal washes and fecal specimens in IC ferrets and persisted for 4 days after  
220 indirect contact; only one of the two positive animals seroconverted. These data show that  
221 airborne transmission is likely, but is considerably less robust than direct contact  
222 transmission.

223 Following the fortuitous discovery of the natural susceptibility of ferrets to human  
224 influenza viruses, ferret models were found to highly reproduce the human disease  
225 manifestation of several respiratory viruses including respiratory syncytial virus,  
226 parainfluenzaviruses, and SARS-CoV-1 (Capraro et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2018; Enkirch and  
227 Von Messling, 2015; Park et al., 2018). In addition to the presence of the respective viral  
228 receptors, the anatomic proportions of the ferret upper and lower respiratory tracts, the  
229 density of submucosal glands in the bronchial wall and the number of generations of terminal  
230 bronchioles all reproduce the condition in the human respiratory tract (Enkirch and Von  
231 Messling, 2015). This further supports the significance of ferrets as animal model for human  
232 respiratory viral infection. We demonstrated that SARS-CoV-2 infected ferrets showed high  
233 virus titers in upper respiratory tracts (nasal washes) and consequently transmitted to naïve  
234 ferrets by direct contact at high efficiency, suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 ferret model  
235 recapitulates aspects of the human infection and transmission. Further, as suspected in

236 recent COVID-19 patients (Kim et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2020), we detected the infectious  
237 viruses in urine and fecal specimens of virus-infected ferrets. However, there are also  
238 limitations in SARS-CoV-2 ferret model as SARS-CoV-2 infected ferrets showed only mild  
239 clinical symptoms and relatively lower virus titers in lungs of infected animals compared with  
240 SARS-CoV-1-infected or MERS-CoV-infected hACE2 or hDPP4 transgenic mice (Glass et  
241 al., 2004 and Li et al., 2017). On the other hand, it is also possible that SARS-CoV-2  
242 replicates weaker but persists longer in vivo than SARS-CoV-1, ultimately leading an  
243 asymptomatic carrier with a persistent infection to effectively spread the virus. Therefore,  
244 given that rapid spreading characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 in humans, ferret model would  
245 be a useful tool to evaluate the efficacy of prophylactic anti-virals and preventive vaccines.

246

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248 All animal experiments were approved by the Medical Research Institute, a member  
249 of Laboratory Animal Research Center of Chungbuk National University (LARC) (approval  
250 number: CBNUA-1352-20-02) and were conducted in strict accordance and adherence to  
251 relevant policies regarding animal handling as mandated under the Guidelines for Animal  
252 Use and Care of the Korea Center for Disease Control (K-CDC). Viruses were handled in an  
253 enhanced biosafety level 3 (BSL3) containment laboratory as approved by the Korean  
254 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC-14-3-07).

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261

262 **Author Contributions**

263 Conceptualization: Y.I. Kim, S.J. Park, R.J. Webby, J.U Jung, Y.K. Choi.

264 Investigation: Y.I. Kim, S.G. Kim, S.M. Kim, E.H. Kim, S.J. Park, K.M. Yu, J.H Chang, E.J.

265 Kim, M.A.B Casel, V.D. Lai, S.H Lee, J. Um, Y. Kim, B.S. Chin, J.S. Park, H.W. Jeong, S.S.

266 Foo, H. Poo, I.P. Mo, O.K. Lee, M.S. Song, Y.K. Choi.

267 Writing: Y.I. Kim, S.J. Park, R.J. Webby, J.U. Jung, Y.K. Choi.

268

269 **Competing interests**

270 Jae U Jung is a scientific advisor of Vaccine Stabilization Institute, a California corporation.

271 **Reference List**

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351 **Figure Legends**

352 **Figure 1. Temperature changes, weight loss, survival, viral shedding and**  
353 **immunohistochemistry of tissues of infected ferrets NMC-nCoV02 infected ferret.** Six  
354 ferrets were inoculated intranasally with  $10^{5.5}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> of virus. (A) Temperature changes, (B)  
355 the number of viral RNA copies and (C) infectious virus titers were measured in tissues of  
356 NMC-nCoV02-infected ferrets (n=6/group). Each tissues (n=3 per group) were collected at 4,  
357 8 and 12 dpi. Viral loads in nasal turbinate, trachea, lung, kidney, and intestine were titered  
358 using a quantitative real time PCR and TCID<sub>50</sub>. Data is presented as mean  $\pm$  SEM. (D)  
359 Serum neutralizing (SN) antibody titers (GMT) against NMC-nCoV02 (100 TCID<sub>50</sub>) was  
360 measured onto Vero cells after 12 days of experiment (n=6 per group). Data is presented as  
361 geometric mean  $\pm$  SD. Tissues were harvested on day 4 after inoculation and performed the  
362 immunohistochemistry with a mouse polyclonal antibody. Tissues of PBS control ferrets; (E)  
363 Nasal turbinate, (F) Trachea, (G) lung, and (H) Intestine. Tissues of NMC-nCoV02 infected  
364 ferrets: (I) Nasal turbinate, (J) Trachea, (K) lung, and (L) Intestine. The presence of NMC-  
365 nCoV02 antigen was determined by IHC with mouse polyclonal antibody. Magnification x400.  
366 Asterisks indicate statistical significance compared with PBS control group by the two way  
367 ANOVA with Sidaks multiple comparisons test (A), the two way ANOVA with Dunnett's  
368 multiple comparisons test (B-C) or one way ANOVA Dunnett's multiple comparisons test (\*  
369 indicates  $p < 0.05$ , \*\* indicates  $p < 0.001$ , and \*\*\* indicates  $p < 0.0001$ ).

370

## KEY RESOURCES TABLE

REAGENT or RESOURCE	SOURCE	IDENTIFIER
Antibodies		
In-house mouse polyclonal antibody	This study	N/A
Bacterial and Virus Strains		
SARS-CoV-2; NMC-nCoV02	This study	N/A
Biological Samples		
Ferret nasal wash samples	This study	See Table 1
Ferret blood samples	This study	See Table 1
Ferret saliva samples	This study	See Table 1
Ferret urine samples	This study	See Table 1
Ferret fecal samples	This study	See Table 1
Chemicals, Peptides, and Recombinant Proteins		
Trypsin	Thermo Fisher Scientific	Cat#15090-046
Carbo-free blocking Solution	VECTOR	Cat#SP-5040
iQ SYBR green supermix	Biorad	Cat#1708882
Penicillin-Streptomycin	Gibco	Cat#15140-122
Critical Commercial Assays		
Omniscript RT kit	QIAGEN	Cat#205113
RNeasy mini kit	QIAGEN	Cat#74106
Vecstain ABC kit	VECTOR	Cat#PK-6102
DAB substrate kit, peroxidase	VECTOR	Cat#SK-4100
Experimental Models: Cell Lines		
African green monkey: Vero cells	ATCC	Cat#ATCC CCL-81; RRID: CVCL_0059
Experimental Models: Organisms/Strains		
Ferret ( <i>Mustela putorius furo</i> )	ID BIO	N/A
Oligonucleotides		
SARS-CoV-2 S F : attcaagactcactttctccaca	This study	See Table 1
SARS-CoV-2 S R : tgtttaaagcttgatcttttggtgacc	This study	See Table 1
SARS-CoV-2 ORF1a F : ccctgtgggttttacacttaa	This study	See Table S1
SARS-CoV-2 S ORF1a R : tcagctgatgcacaatcgt	This study	See Table S1
Software and Algorithms		
GraphPad Prism 8.3.1	N/A	<a href="https://www.graphpad.com/">https://www.graphpad.com/</a>

## RESOURCE AVAILABILITY

### Lead contact

Further information and requests for resources and reagents should be directed to and will be fulfilled by the Lead Contact, Young Ki Choi (choiki55@chungbuk.ac.kr).

### Materials Availability

All unique/stable reagents generated in this study are available from the Lead Contact with a completed Materials Transfer Agreement.

### Data Code and Availability

This study did not generate any unique datasets or code.

## EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS

### Experimental Animals

Male and female ferrets, 12- to 20- month old and sero-negative for influenza A viruses, MERS-CoV, and SARS-CoV (ID Bio Corporation) were maintained in the isolator (woori IB Corporation) in BSL3 of Chungbuk National University. All ferrets were group housed with a 12h light/dark cycle and allowed access to diet and water. All animal studies were carried out in accordance with protocols approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) in Chungbuk National University.

### Growth and Isolation of virus

Virus was isolated from an isolate of SARS-CoV-2 from a COVID-19 confirmed patient in Korea. To infect the animal, viruses were propagated on the Vero cells in the DMEM medium (Gibco)

supplemented with 1% penicillin/streptomycin (Gibco) and TPCK trypsin (0.5ug/ml; Worthington Biochemical) at 37°C for 72hrs. Propagated viruses were stored at -80°C freezer for future usage.

## **METHOD DETAILS**

### **Study design for animal-to-animal transmission**

12 -24 month old male and female ferrets, which were confirmed as Influenza A (H1N1, H3N1), MERS-CoV, and SARS-CoV antibody free ferrets by the standard enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) previously described elsewhere (El-Duah et al., 2019; Park et al., 2014; Woo et al., 2005), were infected through intranasal (IN) route with NMC2019-nCoV02 virus, an isolate of SARS-CoV-2 from a COVID-19 confirmed patient in Korea, 2020 February, at a dose of  $10^{5.5}$  TCID<sub>50</sub> per ferrets (n=2). At one-day post-infection, one naïve direct contact (DC) and indirect contact (IC) ferrets were introduced into the cage, while IC ferrets were separated from inoculated animals with a partition, which allowed air to move, and without direct contact between animals. This study was conducted with three independent trials. Blood, fecal, nasal wash, saliva, and urine specimens were collected every other day for 12 days from each group of ferrets to detect SARS-CoV-2. Further, to investigate whether each collected specimen contained infectious live virus, we inoculated it onto Vero cells.

To assess the replication of the virus in ferrets following SARS-CoV-2 infection in various organs, additional 9 ferrets were infected with SARS-CoV-2 by IN route. Three ferrets were sacrificed at 4, 8 and 12 dpi and their lung, liver, spleen, kidney, and intestinal tissues were collected with individual scissors to avoid cross contamination.

### **Quantitative real-time RT-PCR (qRT-PCR) to detect SARS-CoV-2 RNA**

Collected ferret secretions were resuspended with cold phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) containing antibiotics (5% penicillin/streptomycin; Gibco). For virus titration, total RNA was extracted from the collected samples using the RNeasy Mini<sup>®</sup> kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany) according to the manufacturer's instructions. A cDNA synthesis kit (Omniscript Reverse Transcriptase; QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany) was used to synthesize single strand cDNA using total viral RNA. To quantify viral RNA and viral copy number, quantitative real-time RT-PCR (qRT-PCR) was performed for the partial Spike gene (Table 1) and ORF1a (Supplementary Table 1) with the SYBR Green kit (iQ<sup>™</sup> SYBR Green supermix kit, Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA, USA), and the number of viral RNA copies was calculated and compared to the number of copies of the standard control.

### **Immunohistochemistry (IHC)**

Tissue samples were collected from PBS control and NMC-nCoV02 infected ferrets and incubated in 10% neutral-buffered formalin for fixation before they were embedded in paraffin based to standard procedures. The embedded tissues were sectioned and dried for 3 days at room temperature. To detect the viral antigen by immunohistochemistry, mouse polyclonal antibody developed by inactivated NMC-nCoV02 was used as the primary antibody. Antigen was visualized using the biotin-avidin system (Vector Labs). Slides were viewed using the Olympus IX 71 (Olympus, Tokyo, Japan) microscope with DP controller software to capture images.

## **QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

### **Statistical Analysis**

The statistical significance of infected and contact samples compared with naive sample was assessed by two-way ANOVA with Sidaks multiple comparisons test and one way ANOVA

Dunnett's multiple comparisons test. While for the comparison of the significance of viral copy number or titer among samples, we use the two-way ANOVA with Dunnett's multiple comparisons test.

Data plotting, interpolation and statistical analysis were performed using GraphPad Prism 8.2 (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA). Statistical details of experiments are described in the figure legends. A p-value less than 0.05 is considered statistically significant.

**Table 1. Quantitation of viral RNA in specimens (serum, feces, nasal wash, saliva, and urine) from each group of ferrets**

Route	Ferret groups	Days post treatment; log <sub>10</sub> copies/ml (log <sub>10</sub> TCID <sub>50</sub> /ml) <sup>†</sup>					
		2	4	6	8	10	12
<b>Serum</b>	Infected	0.35±0.08	0.35±0.08	-	-	-	-
	DC	-	-	-	-	-	-
	IC	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Naive	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Nasal washes</b>	Infected	2.67±1.01 <sup>**</sup> (2.17±0.94 <sup>*</sup> )	3.83±0.94 <sup>***</sup> (2.88±0.84 <sup>***</sup> )	2.67±0.63 <sup>**</sup> (1.83±0.63 <sup>*</sup> )	1.40±1.06	-	-
	DC	0.67±0.34 <sup>*</sup>	3.27±1.31(2.40±1.17)	1.48±0.23(1.00±0.25)	1.38±1.00	-	-
	IC	-	0.53±0.36	0.39±0.17 <sup>*</sup>	0.38±0.16	-	-
	Naive	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Saliva</b>	Infected	1.73±0.54 <sup>**</sup> (0.92±0.38)	1.67±0.94 <sup>*</sup> (0.82±0.62)	0.60±0.47	0.50±0.49	-	-
	DC	0.52±0.33	0.85±0.48 <sup>*</sup>	0.53±0.21	0.38±0.2	-	-
	IC	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Naive	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Urine</b>	Infected	0.81±0.56	0.87±0.53 (2/3) <sup>§</sup>	0.52±0.40	0.35±0.12	-	-
	DC	0.72±0.42	1.08±0.81 (2/3)	-	-	-	-
	IC	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Naive	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Fecal</b>	Infected	1.37±0.38 <sup>*</sup>	1.51±0.52 <sup>**</sup> (2/3)	0.77±0.73	0.53±0.38	-	-
	DC	0.42±0.10	1.40±0.51 <sup>*</sup> (2/3)	0.92±1.04	0.80±0.80	-	-
	IC	-	0.52±0.44 (0/3)	1.08±0.73 <sup>*</sup>	-	-	-
	Naive	-	-	-	-	-	-

<sup>†</sup> Virus Spike RNA gene detection limit and viral titer limit were 0.3 log<sub>10</sub> copies/ml and 0.8 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/ml, respectively.

<sup>§</sup> Re-isolated viruses from nasal wash samples inoculated in ferrets.

Infected: NMC-nCoV02 infected group, DC; direct contacted group, IC: indirect infected group

Asterisks indicate statistical significance compared with naive sample by the Ordinary one-way ANOVA with Dunnett's multiple comparisons test (\* indicates  $p < 0.05$ , \*\* indicates  $p < 0.001$ , and \*\*\* indicates  $p < 0.0001$ ).

Figure 1.

